

**DEVELOPING
COMMUNICATIVE
COMPETENCE
IN A SECOND LANGUAGE**

Edited by

Robin C. Scarcella

University of California, Irvine

Elaine S. Andersen and Stephen D. Krashen

University of Southern California



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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE PROCESS OF MARKETING NEGOTIATIONS USING A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

John L. Graham

University of Southern California

Increasingly, commercial relationships span both political borders and cultural boundaries. Negotiation is the most common means of managing the inevitable conflicts that arise between business organizations. Yet we know little about negotiations across cultures. The business literature in the United States has been almost devoid of articles specifically addressing cross-cultural negotiations. A few have appeared in business journals (e.g., Van Zandt 1970, Jastram 1974, Kapoor 1974, Wells 1977), but they are primarily descriptive and often anecdotal in nature. No confirmation of findings has been reported and occasionally opposing prescriptions have been suggested.

International commerce is most often conducted between buying and selling professionals. Examples of such transactions might be sales of high-technology industrial products or interorganizational price negotiations within a cross-national distribution channel. This study focuses on such buyer-seller relationships and the process of face-to-face bargaining between Japanese and American executives. Or, precisely stated:

How does cultural variation of the parties affect the process and outcome of marketing negotiations?

Because this is the first systematic study of the phenomenon, a broad methodological approach is used. That is, a combination of methods, borrowed from several fields, is included to maximize the comprehensiveness of the examination of the phenomenon.

The remainder of the chapter is organized into five sections. First, the theoretical perspective is briefly discussed. Next, methods of data collection are described. Third, the results of the analyses of verbal behaviors are presented. The fourth section consists of the analyses of nonverbal behaviors. Finally, the results are summarized and conclusions drawn.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Here the theoretical perspective of the research is briefly discussed to provide a context for the presentation of the exploratory methods used and the results reported in later sections. (For a comprehensive review of the relevant literature see Graham 1980.) Generally speaking, the theory is not well developed. Thus, a principal contribution of this work is the suggestion of new theories about marketing negotiations (i.e., rather than the testing of present theories).

Most recently, the outcomes of marketing negotiations have been hypothesized to be the result of several factors that can be classified into three categories or kinds of theoretical constructs: individual characteristics, situational constraints, and process measures (cf. Rubin and Brown 1975). Many empirical measures of both individual characteristics and situational constraints have been tested in previous research. Examples of such individual characteristics might be intelligence, self-esteem, credibility, attractiveness, and power. Examples of situational constraints might include company goals, time limitations, or unequal power relations.

Process Measures

A few studies have focused on the process of marketing negotiations (e.g., Pennington 1968, Pruitt and Lewis 1975, Lewis and Fry 1977, Dwyer and Walker 1981). Based on an extensive review of the negotiation literature, Rubin and Brown (1975) concluded that both the attitudes and behaviors of bargainers *during the negotiation process* affect negotiation outcomes. They suggest such *attitudes* include motivational orientation or interpersonal orientation. The kinds of *behaviors* listed are opening moves, countermoves, types of appeals, demands, and the like. But little work has been done to test relationships between process measures (i.e., attitudes or behaviors) and negotiation outcomes.

Moreover, because researchers have only recently turned their attention to process measures, concepts and operational definitions remain vague and relations not adequately specified. The present study focuses on the development of opera-

tional definitions of process measures and the relation of these variables to outcomes of cross-cultural marketing negotiations.

Cross-Cultural Marketing Negotiations—A Situational Constraint

The concept of culture, as it relates to marketing negotiations, has not been previously investigated in a systematic way (cf. Angelmar and Stern 1978). The situational constraint of a *cross-cultural* negotiation has been hypothesized to negatively affect both the *process* and the *outcomes* of negotiations (Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965). But once again few studies have examined such relationships using a scientific approach.

Indeed, culture has been a difficult concept to deal with in any consistent way. Anthropologists and sociologists have been arguing over definitions for years. Culture has appeared in the marketing literature primarily as a determinant of buyer behavior (e.g., Engel and Kollat 1982), but operational definitions seem to have varied from study to study. Perhaps the most widely accepted definition is that professed by Linton (1945): "A culture is a configuration of learned behaviors and results of behavior whose component parts are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society." The important part of the definition for the present research is the idea that behaviors are *shared* by members of a particular culture. Or as Spiro (1950) puts it, ". . . members of a given society behave in uniform and predictable ways." A central goal of the study is to discover what shared behaviors manifest themselves during business negotiations in Japan and the United States.

In addition to bargaining behaviors being consistent *within* cultures, several authors have suggested that negotiation processes differ *across* cultures (e.g., Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965, Kay 1970, Frake 1972, Van Zandt 1970, Condon 1974).

Given the hypothesized culture-specific bargaining behaviors, what will happen during cross-cultural bargaining interactions? And in particular, what will happen when a Japanese businessman meets an American executive across the negotiation table? The only information we have about the latter phenomenon is descriptive in nature (cf. Van Zandt 1970).

Therefore, a second purpose of this work is to further explore cross-cultural marketing negotiations, looking for potential or real process inefficiencies and associated antecedents and consequences.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

In this section, the procedures of data collection are presented. The discussion begins with a brief description of preliminary field work, including interviews with experienced executives and participant observations of marketing negotiations. Next, the sample of business people participating in the research is specified. Third,

the laboratory setting is described. Fourth, data collection instruments are presented.

Preliminary Fieldwork

Blumer (1969) suggests, "No theorizing, however ingenious, and no observance of scientific protocol, however meticulous, are substitutes for developing a familiarity with what is actually going on in the sphere of life under study" (1969: 39). In that vein, a preliminary step in this research has been extensive fieldwork consisting of both executive interviews and participant observation of marketing negotiations.

Executive interviews As mentioned previously, the essence of this study is the examination of the relationships among the explanatory variables (culture), the endogenous variable (process measures), and the dependent variable (outcome measures). Because these relationships have not been systematically investigated, conceptualizations of these terms have been vague and superficial. Survey techniques might be applied to clarify the concepts and to determine how the process of marketing negotiations differs across cultures. Open-ended interviews would be the most productive method—one that allows for exploration and clarification. As part of the preliminary fieldwork in this study, 16 such interviews were conducted with both Japanese businessmen working in this country and American businessmen with experience in cross-cultural negotiations. The results of these interviews are adequately consistent, but descriptive only (Graham 1980). Furthermore, the level of awareness of "a process of negotiation" varied among the interviewees. Indeed, this is a most important limitation of most survey techniques—it is difficult to give unbiased accounts of one's own behaviors, particularly when the behaviors of interest may manifest themselves below the level of awareness.

Participant observations Direct observation of cross-cultural marketing negotiations is a feasible method of determining the relationship of culture and process. The study by Pennington (1968) is the best example of this sort of research. In that study, content analysis was used to quantitatively describe the process of sales interactions between salesmen and customers. This author has observed marketing interactions in this country (eight intracultural) and in Japan (eight cross-cultural). These observations have provided important insight and clarification for the development of the hypotheses and for the structuring of the laboratory experimentation. There are limitations, however, associated with such methods. First is the variability of the interactions observed, caused by the multiplicity of variables—individual characteristics and situational constraints. Furthermore, observer bias is an important limitation that might be overcome by tape-recording the interactions. This author, however, was not permitted to record interactions regarding large capital equipment expenditures. Others might suggest recording sales interactions regarding different product categories, as in the Pennington (1968) study. Wells (1977), however, indicates that bargaining behaviors differ between "bazaar" or "street markets," and high-level marketing negotiations between executives of large corporations, the latter being the circumstance of interest in the present research.

Laboratory Experimentation

Both the survey methods and the participant observation methods described above have contributed to the structuring of the laboratory experimentation. A laboratory methodology, however, is the most appropriate for looking deeply into the phenomenon. Several others have employed such methods in the study of negotiations in marketing settings (Green, Gross, and Robinson 1967; Mathews, Wilson, and Monoky 1972; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Lewis and Fry 1977; Angelmar and Stern 1978). The laboratory offers the advantage of control of the multiple confounding factors already mentioned, and it affords the researcher the opportunity to focus attention on the relationship of interest. Below is described the research design employed in this phase of the study.

Sample The participants in the experiment were 12 Japanese businessmen and 12 American businessmen. All have been members of graduate business classes at the University of Southern California, and all have at least two years business experience in their respective countries. The sample was limited to experienced businessmen because Fouraker and Siegel (1963) reported differences in the bargaining behavior of students and businessmen. The participants were asked to play the role of either buyer or seller in a negotiation simulation. Three kinds of interactions were staged: three Japanese/Japanese, three American/American, and six American/Japanese.

Laboratory setting The negotiation simulation, developed by Kelley (1966) and recently used by Pruitt and Lewis (1975) and Lewis and Fry (1977), involves bargaining for the prices of three commodities. Differing amounts and types of background information can be included with the basic pay-off matrices, depending on the focus of the research. In the present work, however, culture of the parties was the only experimental manipulation. The simulation is simple enough to be learned quickly, but complex enough to provide usually one half hour of face-to-face interaction.

Several other negotiation and bargaining games were reviewed. Kelley's game was selected primarily because it simulates the essential elements of actual marketing negotiations observed in the preliminary field research. Social psychologists and exchange theorists have described these essential elements. First, several authors, including Thibaut and Kelley (1959), and most recently Bagozzi (1978), indicate that observation of interaction between two actors, a dyad, is sufficient. They reason that all group interaction can be analyzed as a complex series of dyadic relations. Second, Bonoma (1976) specifies the most common type of interdependence in social exchange relationships: Mixed-motive interdependence is the situation where the actors have both competitive and cooperative motives for participation in the interaction. In the simulation, participants are instructed (1) to achieve an agreement (cooperation), and (2) to achieve the highest profits possible (competition). Third, in the usual "big-ticket" transactions of cross-cultural marketing, the relative power of the interactants is more nearly equal than in other sales encounters. Thus, a negotiated agreement is most frequently the case.

It should be noted that all intracultural negotiations were conducted in the

respective native languages (including game instructions). All cross-cultural negotiations were conducted in English. Language is by no means an insignificant issue, and it is discussed further in later sections.

Data collection A combination of methods was used in collecting data for analysis. First, each participant was asked to complete a questionnaire following the bargaining sessions. A copy of the questionnaire is included in the Appendix. Second, each interaction was videotaped, thus allowing for a series of observational methodologies to be applied.

Questionnaire data: several measures of negotiation outcomes, process measures, and individual characteristics were derived from responses to the questionnaire. The following are the four outcome variables associated with Kelley's (1966) negotiation game:

1. Individual profit levels
2. Joint profit level
3. Time of negotiations
4. Expressed satisfaction with the agreement

The outcome variables along with the other variables developed in the study are listed in Table 1.

Process measures were derived from participants' responses to the postgame questionnaires. The bargaining strategies of the participants were rated on three dimensions: representational/instrumental, power, and credibility, using single- and multiple-item Likert scales answered by both participants (representational/instrumental, four items; power, one item; credibility, one item). Interpersonal attraction was measured using a three-item Likert scale. All scales were developed specifically for this research.

The last process measure, impression formation accuracy, was determined by summing differences in responses to questions (regarding the strategy ratings above) asked both participants. For example, both buyer and seller were asked to rate the buyer's strategies on a five-point scale, "honest" to "deceptive." The sum of these differences on all three items can vary from 0 to 12, 12 being the lowest impression formation accuracy.

Cultural variation of the parties was the experimental manipulation. Each participant was asked to list his city of residence, location of education, and the extent of previous overseas residence. The responses to these questions served as a check and documentation of the manipulation.

Measures of individual characteristics were also derived from the postgame questionnaires. Generalized self-esteem was measured using the Jackson Personality Inventory, a 20-item Likert scale, which has also been used in sales performance studies by Triki (1973) and Bagozzi (1978). Task-specific self-esteem was measured by asking each participant to rate his negotiation skill on a three-item Likert scale. Introversion/extroversion was measured using a six-item scale developed by Eysenck (1958) and used extensively by psychologists. Finally, each participant was asked to indicate what percentage of his work "involved contact with people outside your firm," number of years of work experience, and age.

TABLE 1 Variables Derived from Questionnaires

Category	Symbol	Variable	Description and measure
Outcome variables	IP	Individual profit level	Profit level associated with final agreement in Kelley's (1966) negotiation game for either buyer or seller, range = 28 to 80
	JP	Joint profit level	Profit level for dyad, range = 56 to 104
	T	Time	Time spent in negotiation, range = 0 to 60 minutes
	S	Satisfaction	Expressed satisfaction by either buyer or seller, one five-point Likert item, range = 1 to 5
Process measures	RI	Representational/Instrumental strategies	Buyer and seller ratings of strategies along representational/instrumental continuum, four Likert items, range = -8 to +8
	A	Attractiveness	Ratings of interpersonal attraction, three Likert items, range = 4 to 20
	P	Power	Ratings of power of one another's bargaining strategies, one Likert item, range = 1 to 5
	C	Credibility	Ratings of credibility of one another's bargaining strategies, one Likert item, range = 1 to 5
Situational constraints	IFA	Impression formation accuracy	Comparison of one another's ratings on three items, range = 0 to 12, low values indicate high accuracy
	X	Cultural variation of the dyads	Experimental treatment intra-cultural dyads = 1, cross-cultural = 0
	JA	Culture of individuals	Experimental treatment, Japanese negotiations = 0, American negotiations = 1
Individual	SB	Role of Player	Seller = 0, buyer = 1
	GE	Generalized self-esteem	Jackson Personality Inventory, 20 Likert items, range = 20 to 100
	SE	Task-specific self-esteem	Buyer and seller ratings of their own bargaining skill, three five-point Likert items, range = 3 to 9
	IE	Extroversion	Introversion/extroversion, six Likert items (Eysenck scale), range = -6 to +6
	IW	Interorganizational contact	Percentage of work involving contact outside the participants' company, range = 0 to 90%
	WE	Work experience	Number of years work experience
	AGE	Age	Age of the participants

The focus of this work is on the development and clarification of process measures of cross-cultural sales negotiations. Consequently, the measures derived from the questionnaires will be compared to those measures derived from analysis of the videotapes. The questionnaire data have been analyzed using a variety of statistical techniques using much larger sample sizes. The results of that work are not reported here, but may be found in my other work (Graham 1980).

Videotape data: There are significant limitations to the use of the questionnaire data described above. First, the reliability and validity of the process measures depend entirely upon the participants' memory and impressions of events. Moreover, insight into the causal mechanisms is limited to inferences derived from quantitative analysis of participant self-reports and further deductions by the researcher.

There remain a series of unexplored questions: What are the qualities of a credible or powerful argument? How does a participant form an impression about his bargaining opponent? What are the antecedents of interpersonal attraction? What are the antecedents of communication problems? Such questions demand a more inductive approach, a research methodology that looks deeply into the phenomenon and explores for causal mechanisms and clear concepts of variables. Such questions demand independent and repeated observations of the phenomenon. Videotape-recording of sales negotiations provides the data for such an exploration.

The 12 interactions between Japanese and American businessmen were videotaped using three cameras: one to record the interactions from a wide-angle side view to capture postures, body movements, and interpersonal distances; and two other cameras to focus on the faces of the participants to capture facial expressions. All cameras were mounted in the ceiling of a behavior science laboratory and operated by remote control, thereby minimizing obtrusions. Additionally, all participants were asked to evaluate the obtrusiveness of the setting on questionnaires following the negotiation game. All participants reported a minimum of discomfort.

ANALYSIS OF VERBAL BEHAVIORS

As mentioned, a primary purpose in this exploratory work is the identification and clarification of process measures. Consequently, the discussions in the sections to follow are organized as a "list" of process measures. Associated with each item on the "list" are operational definitions, a brief account of the method of measurement, and specification of relations to outcome measures, cultural variation of the parties, and other process measures from the questionnaires. Table 2 lists the variables developed in this part of the study. They are ordered in the sequence of the discussion to follow.

The first step in the measurement and analysis of verbal behaviors during the marketing negotiations is the transcription of the audio portion of the videotapes. This is a potential source of error in measurement. A complete check of the transcripts did reveal some minor mistakes, and these were corrected. Generally, errors in the transcription process were found to be inconsequential.

TABLE 2 Process Measures Developed Using Observational Methodologies

Category	Symbol	Variable	Description and measure
Verbal behaviors	BB1 to BB12	Bargaining behaviors	Angelmar and Stern's (1978) content analysis scheme; the 12 categories are listed and defined in Table 4
	TC	Topical controlled	A measure (%) of topical control by each participant, judgments made by two observers
	01	First offer	The profit level associated with each participant's first offer
	02	Second offer	The profit level associated with second offers
Nonverbal behaviors	SP	Silent periods	The number of conversational gaps (^c 10 seconds) broken by each participant per unit time
	OV	Conversational overlaps	Number of interruptions by each speaker per unit time
	AU12	Smiles	Number of movements of AU12* in Ekman and Friesen's (1976) Facial Action Coding System, per randomly selected ten minute period
	AU4	Brow wrinkles	Number of movements of AU 4, as above
	SFE	Synchrony of facial expression	Number of simultaneous AU12 movements (player and opponent) divided by total AU12 movements of individual participants, a percent
	FG	Facial gazing	Number of minutes players spend looking at opponent's face, per randomly selected ten-minute period

*AU = action unit.

The second step in the measurement and analysis process consisted of translation of the three Japanese/Japanese interactions in which Japanese was spoken throughout. Here exists another source of measurement error. Two translators were used and the process involved four steps: (1) transcription of the tapes into Japanese characters; (2) transformation of the characters to "romanized" script (using the English alphabet and phonetic spelling); (3) a literal translation; and (4) a meaning translation. Because of resource limitations in the study, the translations were spot-checked for accuracy and minor discrepancies were discovered and corrected.

All of these steps in the process proved to be very time-consuming and expensive, thus putting very real limitations on the number of interactions that might be analyzed.

The transcripts were further analyzed using two schemes. First, a content analysis scheme was employed to identify the bargaining behaviors of each participant. Second, each participant's concession strategies were summarized. Each of these steps is discussed in detail below.

Content Analysis

Several measures of the process of negotiations (both attitudes and behaviors), derived from the responses to the questionnaires, were described earlier in Table 1. Another kind of process measurement scheme, content analysis, is applied here.

Measurement Recently, Angelmar and Stern (1978) have described a content analytic scheme developed specifically for the analysis of bargaining communications in marketing settings. Utterances by participants are classified into 12 categories. The categories and definitions are listed in Table 4. Angelmar and Stern report positive results from a reliability and validity assessment of the system as applied to *written* communications. Previous application of the scheme to transcripts of *conversations* has not been reported. During the coding of the data, it soon became apparent that coding conversations is a more difficult undertaking. During conversations, spoken words are only one channel of communication. Transcripts do not include information communicated through other channels such as proxemics, prosody, kinesics, or facial expression. Theory indicates that these channels may also be important for accurate interpretation and measurement of conversational contributions.

Two coders were employed in classifying segments of the conversation into the 12 bargaining categories. This investigator coded all 12 interactions and a research assistant (ignorant of the theory and hypotheses involved in the study) coded three interactions to provide a reliability check. The author is cognizant of the possible bias involved with using coders informed about the theory applied in the research. Resource constraints, however, necessitated this less than ideal state. Significantly, analysis of discrepancies in coding between the two coders revealed this source of bias to be minimal.

Despite the limitations described above, the coding system proved adequately reliable in this work. As can be seen in Table 3, both unitizing and coding reliabilities compare favorably with those reported by Angelmar and Stern (1978: 99).¹

The content validity of the scheme applied to conversational data is a more difficult issue. In addition to units being classified into an "other" category, a small percentage of units (2.7%) were classified as "restatements and clarifications." In the latter case, a statement that duplicated the statement previous to it was classified separately. Indeed, as one might predict, the percentage of "restatement and clarifications" in the cross-cultural sample (4.2%) is over three times that in the intra-cultural samples (1.1%). The statements that did not fit into any of the other 12 categories were assigned to the "other" category. The large discrepancy between Angelmar and Stern's results (2.3%) and the findings for this study (10.3%) is due to the aforementioned differences between *written* and *spoken* communication.

TABLE 3 Content Analysis Scheme Reliability and Content Validity

Type of test	Type of analysis performed	Angelmar and Stern's (1978: 99) results	Results*			
			J	A	X	JAX
Unitizing reliability	Difference in the number of units between coders as a percentage of sum of units	.03	.095	.035	.025	.052
	Agreements concerning unit boundaries as percentage of sum of agreements and disagreements	.69	.77	.86	.85	.82
Coding reliability	Agreements as percentage of total number of codings	66%	69%	59%	63%	64%
Content validity	(Number of units coded: 2-3%)		190	166	217	573)
	Percent units coded in "other" category		10.9%	6.7%	11.1%	10.3%
	Percent units coded in "re-statements and clarifications" category		.07%	1.8%	4.2%	2.7%
	(Number of units coded: 542		326	927	1795)	

*J = Japanese/Japanese interactions; A = American/American interactions; X = Japanese/American interactions; JAX = J, A, X combined.

Many conversational bits were incomplete, and in some cases not even complete words, and consequently unclassifiable.

Based on the classification of the various units, percentages of each bargaining category were calculated for each participant for each negotiation. These findings are summarized in Table 4. As the data indicate, the percentages of each category are very consistent across the three groups. The next step in the analysis is the investigation of relationships among these variables—i.e., the percentages of units in each bargaining category (BB1 to BB12) related to various outcome variables, process measures, situational constraints, and individual characteristics derived from the questionnaire.

Findings related to the count of bargaining behaviors The first relationships explored are those between the player bargaining behaviors and outcome variables. As indicated in Table 5, there are a few significant relationships. Rewards are strongly and positively related to profit level ($p < 0.05$). The frequency of rewards in the sample, however, is extremely low—2% (see Table 4); thus, the importance of this relationship is limited. Players' profit levels are strongly and inversely related to commitments ($p < 0.05$). Commitments also appear to be an important part of the bargaining process—14% (see Table 4). Player satisfaction appears to be almost totally independent of bargaining behavior.

As indicated in Table 5, player outcome variables are strongly related to

TABLE 4 Summary Content Analysis Findings

Symbol	Bargaining behaviors and definition	J*	A	X	JAX
BB1	Promise. A statement in which the source indicated his intention to provide the target with a reinforcing consequence which source anticipates target will evaluate as pleasant, positive, or rewarding.	7†	8	6	7
BB2	Threat. Same as promise, except that the reinforcing consequences are thought to be noxious, unpleasant, or punishing.	4	4	2	2
BB3	Recommendation. A statement in which the source predicts that a pleasant environmental consequence will occur to the target. Its occurrence is not under the source's control.	7	4	4	5
BB4	Warning. Same as recommendation, except that the consequences are thought to be unpleasant.	2	1	1	1
BB5	Reward. A statement by the source that is thought to create pleasant consequences for the target.	1	2	2	2
BB6	Punishment. Same as reward, except that the consequences are thought to be unpleasant.	1	3	1	1
BB7	Positive normative appeal. A statement in which the source indicates that the target's past, present, or future behavior was or will be in conformity with social norms.	1	1	1	1
BB8	Negative normative appeal. Same as positive normative appeal, except that the target's behavior is in violation of social norms.	3	1	1	2
BB9	Commitment. A statement by the source to the effect that its future bids will not go below or above a certain level.	15	13	15	14
BB10	Self-disclosure. A statement in which the source reveals information about itself.	34	36	39	37
BB11	Question. A statement in which the source asks the target to reveal information about itself.	20	20	23	22
BB12	Command. A statement in which the source suggests that the target perform a certain behavior.	8	6	5	7
BB13	Other. Unclassifiable statements. not included in the analysis				
BB14	Restatements and clarifications. A statement which duplicates the speaker's previous statement. not included in the analysis				

*J = Japanese/Japanese interactions; A = American/American interactions; X = Japanese/American interactions; JAX = J, A, X combined.

†Units in individual categories as percentage of total units.

several categories of *opponent* bargaining behaviors. Threats and questions are strongly and negatively related to players' profit levels. Opponents' recommendations are strongly and positively related to both players' profit levels and expressed satisfaction. All these relationships are statistically significant ($p < 0.10$).

In addition to the 12 categories, two more variables were created by pooling categories. First, the percentage of "representational behaviors" was determined by adding the percentages of four categories: recommendations, warnings, commitments, and self-disclosures (as suggested by Angelmar and Stern 1978). Second, the percentage of "negative influence behaviors" was calculated by summing percent-

TABLE 5 A Comparison of Process Variables ($N = 24$): 3 Japanese dyads; 3 American dyads; 6 cross-cultural dyads)

Observational measures*	Measures from questionnaires* (Pearson correlation coefficients)														ANOVA R2		
	IP _p	S _p	RI _p	A _p	P _p	C _p	IFA _p	IP _o	S _o	RI _o	A _o	P _o	C _o	IFA _o	X	SB	JA
Promises (BB1)			-.39 ^b								-.46 ^b		.30 ^c				
Threats (BB2)					.28 ^c		-.42 ^b		.35 ^b			-.34 ^b				.21 ^b	
Recommendations (BB3)							.31 ^c									.28 ^b	
Warnings (BB4)			-.28 ^c		.44 ^b	-.32 ^c					-.31 ^c						
Rewards (BB5)	.41 ^b				.51 ^b				.31 ^c			-.33 ^c					
Punishments (BB6)				-.41 ^b										-.31 ^c			
Positive normative appeals (BB7)					.49 ^b		.36 ^b				-.33 ^c						
Negative normative appeals (BB8)																	
Commitments (BB9)	-.42 ^b				-.41 ^b											.18 ^b	
Self-disclosures (BB10)																	
Questions (BB11)							-.36 ^b										
Commands (BB12)				-.35 ^b						-.28 ^c			-.32 ^c				
Representational behaviors (BB3+BB4+BB9+BB10)	.28 ^b	.07									.28 ^c				.14 ^c		

(continued)

TABLE 5 (Continued)

Observational measures [†]	Measures from questionnaires* (Pearson correlation coefficients)													ANOVA R2					
	IP _p	S _p	RI _p	A _p	P _p	C _p	IFA _p	IP _o	S _o	RI _o	A _o	P _o	C _o	IFA _o	X	SB	JA		
Negative influence behaviors (BB2+BB4+BB6+BB8)																	.13 ^c		
Topical control (TC)																			.35 ^a
1st Offers (01)	.31 ^c		.49 ^a	.43 ^b					.48 ^a	.41 ^b									
2nd Offers (02)	.46 ^b		.34 ^c	.34 ^c	.31 ^c			.34 ^c	.30 ^c	.47 ^b									
Initial conceptions (01-02)			.63 ^a		.32 ^c														.16 ^c
Silent periods (SP)					.31 ^c														
Conversational overlaps (OV)																			
Smiles (AU12)																			.11 ^c
Brow wrinkles (AU4)																			
Synchrony of facial expressions (SFE)																			.14 ^b
Facial gazing (FG)																			.20 ^b

*Variable symbol (Table 1).

†Variable symbol in parentheses (see Table 2).

^ap < 0.01.^bp < 0.05.^cp < 0.10.

ages of four categories: threats, warnings, punishments, and negative normative appeals. These two variables were then compared with player outcome variables. The results are listed in Table 5. Player profit levels are positively associated with the negative influence behaviors of player ($r = .280, p < 0.10$).

The next area to be explored is that of the relationships between bargaining behaviors and other process measures derived from the questionnaires. Table 5 presents the statistically significant relationships *only* ($p < 0.10$). Player representational strategies (RI_p) is negatively related to both promises and warnings. Player attractiveness (A_p) is negatively related to both punishments and commands. Powerful strategies are positively related to recommendations, warnings, rewards, and positive normative appeals, and negatively associated with commitments. Credibility was negatively related to the number of warnings. High impression formation accuracy (low scores) was inversely related to positive normative appeals. All these findings, with the possible exception of the last, are intuitively attractive (i.e., plausible and simple causal mechanisms can be posited). The lack of a relationship between representational strategies (RI_p) and representational behaviors ($r = 0.066$), however, is particularly troublesome. The participants' rating of their strategies apparently does not coincide with the actual content of their arguments. This issue will be discussed further in subsequent sections.

Table 5 also presents findings associated with *opponent* process measures and *player* bargaining behaviors. Again, only statistically significant findings are listed ($p < 0.10$). Opponent's representational strategies are positively associated with player rewards and negatively associated with player commands. Attractive opponents are accompanied by more representational behaviors and fewer promises, warnings, and positive normative appeals. Powerful opponents are associated with fewer threats and rewards by players. Player promises are positively related with high credibility ratings of opponent strategies, while player commands are directly related to low credibility ratings. Finally, opponent's accuracy of impression formation increases with the number of punishments by players.

A primary focus of this research is the influence of cultural variation of the parties on the process of marketing negotiation. Findings concerning the relationship of culture and the parties (a situational constraint) and the bargaining behaviors are discussed here. Table 4 presented a summary breakdown of the bargaining behaviors, including separate percentages for each of the three kinds of interactions: Japanese, American, and cross-cultural. That data indicate an unanticipated consistency across the three groups. Analysis of variance with the several bargaining behaviors as factors confirmed this apparent homogeneity among the three types of situations. There are two exceptions, however, and the associated data are presented in Table 5. In cross-cultural negotiations, parties use a higher percentage of representational behaviors (a pooled category including recommendations, warnings, commitments, and self-disclosures) than in intracultural negotiations. The cultural makeup of the dyad explains 14.2% of the variation in percentage of representational behaviors ($p < 0.10$). Alternatively, fewer negative influence behaviors (another pooled category) are employed in cross-cultural negotiations.

TABLE 6 Relation of Bargaining Behaviors and Individual Characteristics (correlation coefficients, $N = 24^*$)

Bargaining behaviors	Individual characteristics				
	Generalized self-esteem (GE) [†]	Extroversion (IE)	Interorganizational contact (IW)	Work experience (WE)	Age (AGE)
Promises			.455 ²		-.314 ¹
Warnings	.328 ¹	.415 ²			-.348 ²
Positive normative appeals				-.318 ¹	
Commitments	.358 ²				
Self-disclosures	-.542 ²			.327 ³	.483 ²
Questions	.276 ²				
Commands			.356 ²		
Representational			.324 ¹		.391 ²

*Sample includes 3 Japanese dyads, 3 American dyads, and 6 cross-cultural dyads.

[†]Variable symbol (see Table 1).

¹ $p < 0.10$.

² $p < 0.05$.

³ $p < 0.01$.

Culture explains 13.0% of the variation in the percentage of negative influence behaviors ($p < 0.10$).

Stronger relationships are found between another situational constraint, role of the participant (SB), and bargaining behaviors (see Table 5). Buyers use a higher percentage of threats (ANOVA $R^2 = .21$, $p < 0.05$). Sellers make higher percentages of recommendations (ANOVA $R^2 = .28$, $p < 0.05$) and higher percentages of commitments (ANOVA $R^2 = .18$, $p < 0.05$).

The relationship of individual characteristics and bargaining behaviors is the final area to be explored in this section. All of the statistically significant ($p < 0.10$) relationships are presented in Table 6. No such relationships were found between task-specific self-esteem (SE1) and bargaining behaviors, or between any individual characteristics of the participants and threats, recommendations, rewards, punishments, negative normative appeals, or negative influence behaviors. Participants with high generalized self-esteem (GE) engaged in a higher percentage of warnings, commitments, and questions and a lower percentage of self-disclosures. Extroverts made a higher percentage of warnings. Participants whose jobs required a higher percentage of interorganizational contact used a higher percentage of promises and commands, but a lower percentage of representational behaviors. Those with more work experience made fewer positive normative appeals and more self-disclosures. Finally, older participants used a lower percentage of promises and warnings, and a higher percentage of self-disclosures and representational behaviors.

Findings related to the pattern of bargaining behaviors Theory and previous work suggest that the process of marketing negotiations differs across cultures. More specifically, it has been reported that the "pattern" of interaction in Japanese

TABLE 7 A Comparison of Patterns of Bargaining Behaviors

Behaviors	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	Total
Promise	4 / 6*	6 / 3	9 / 13	8 / 9	7 / 8
Threat	3 / 1	1 / 7	4 / 3	7 / 3	4 / 4
Recommendation	10 / 6	2 / 3	5 / 5	7 / 1	7 / 4
Warning	0 / 2	3 / 1	3 / 1	1 / 0	2 / 1
Reward	3 / 4	0 / 2	2 / 2	0 / 1	1 / 2
Punishment	2 / 1	0 / 7	1 / 2	1 / 0	1 / 3
Positive normative appeal	2 / 0	1 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 2	1 / 1
Negative normative appeal	2 / 1	3 / 0	3 / 0	2 / 4	3 / 1
Commitment	4 / 3	19 / 9	12 / 13	19 / 28	15 / 13
Self-disclosure	46 / 48	33 / 33	29 / 34	31 / 30	34 / 36
Question	21 / 20	29 / 22	16 / 20	15 / 20	20 / 20
Command	5 / 8	5 / 14	16 / 9	9 / 2	8 / 6
Combined categories					
Representational behaviors	60 / 59	56 / 46	49 / 53	57 / 58	58 / 54
Negative influence behaviors	7 / 5	7 / 15	11 / 6	11 / 7	10 / 9

*Percent bargaining behaviors for Japanese $N = 6$ / Americans $N = 6$.

sales negotiations differs from that of American sales negotiations (Graham 1980). Pattern here is defined as a time-ordered sequence of specific events. One way to view the "pattern" of interaction is through the perspective of content analysis—the various bargaining behaviors being the "specific events" referred to above. The summary data presented in Table 4 provides some information about pattern, but it provides no information regarding time-ordering.

In this section the dimension of time is added to the analysis. Each interaction was divided into four equal periods. Thus, a 40-minute interaction was divided into 10-minute quarters, a 20-minute interaction into 5-minute quarters, and so on. Percentages of each bargaining behavior were calculated for each participant for each quarter, and the percentages were averaged across participants. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7.

Three propositions regarding differences in the pattern of interaction discussed earlier can be investigated through the data displayed in Table 7. The first, that Japanese ask more questions, is not supported by the data. The percentages of questions for both groups is surprisingly similar and consistent across quarters. The second proposition is that the Americans use more aggressive persuasive tactics. Looking at totals for commands and negative influence behaviors reveals little difference between the two cultural groups. Viewing these categories across quarters, however, reveals an interesting pattern. Americans appear to begin using aggressive persuasive tactics earlier than the Japanese. Notice the differences in Quarter 2 in commands and negative influence categories and the apparent change in pattern in Quarters 3 and 4. The conclusion would be that Americans do not necessarily use "more" aggressive tactics, but they do begin using them "sooner" in the interaction. The third proposition is that Japanese negotiators tend to make concessions toward the end of the negotiations. An examination of the data in Table

7 does not support this final proposition. Indeed, the Americans appear to make more commitments toward the end, the percentage growing through Quarters 1 to 4 (3%, 9%, 13%, 28%). The pattern of commitments for Japanese bargainers is more consistent (4%, 19%, 12%, 19%). This last proposition will be discussed further when concession strategies are examined from a somewhat different perspective.

Findings related to topical control During the course of marketing negotiations different topics are discussed. For example, in the negotiation simulation used in this research three products are involved. At certain points the topic of conversation shifts from one product to the next, or from product quality issues to promotional considerations, and so on. The transcripts were searched for such shifts in topic and the party initiating the shift was identified. The party initiating the shift is considered to *control the topic* of the interaction that follows until the other party initiates a shift, thereby taking control. The 12 content categories listed in Table 4 were used as units of analysis. The total conversational units controlled by each buyer and seller were totaled and percentages of topical control (TC) calculated. This investigator made the judgments involved in this analysis. A reliability check using another uninformed coder indicated good reliability, 2% (calculated in terms of the difference in the number of units between coders as a percentage of the sum of the units).

A comparison of this variable "percent topic control" to other variables in the study reveals several relationships. These are reported in Table 8. There is a borderline positive relationship between individual profits and the percent of conversation controlled. There exists a strong association between topical control and the

TABLE 8 Relation of Topical Control to Several Variables (correlation coefficients, N = 24*)

Variable†	Percent topical control
Outcome variables	
IP _p	.260
IP _p - IP _o	.400 [‡]
S _p	.038
Process measures	
Promises	.309 [‡]
Threats	.368 [‡]
Situational constraints	
ANOVA R ² = .35 [‡]	
(group means: buyer = 60%, seller = 40%)	
Individual characteristics	
WE _p	-.373 [‡]
AGE _p	-.458 [‡]

*Sample includes 3 Japanese dyads, 3 American dyads, and 6 cross-cultural dyads.

†Variable symbol (see Table 1).

[‡]p < 0.10.

[‡]p < 0.05.

[‡]p < 0.01.

difference of outcomes between players ($IP_p - IP_o$, $r = .400$, $p < 0.05$). Players who control much of the conversation do considerably better than their opponents. Topical control appears to be almost entirely independent of other process measures. The only statistically significant relationships with process measures discovered are with two content categories, promises ($r = .309$, $p < 0.10$) and threats ($r = .368$, $p < 0.05$).

Topical control is strongly related to the role of the player (ANOVA $R^2 = .35$, $p < 0.005$). Buyers control a larger percentage of the conversation (60%) than sellers (40%). Two individual characteristics are associated with topical control. Participants with more interorganization experience (WE) and older participants (AGE) controlled smaller portions of the conversation.

Bidding Behaviors

For this part of the analysis *profit levels* associated with player's bids on the three products in the negotiation game were summarized. Profit levels associated with second offers (O2), and the amount of the initial concessions (O1-O2) were compared with the other variables in the study already discussed. These findings are reported in Table 5, and described in detail below.

Findings related to the count of bids Closely related to bidding behaviors are the number of commitments reported previously. Recall that percentage of commitments (which often includes bids) is strongly inversely related to individual profits levels, IP_p ($r = -.416$, $p < 0.05$). Additionally, sellers were more likely to make commitments, SB (ANOVA $R^2 = .18$, $p < 0.05$).

Findings related to the amount of bids Several authors have suggested strong relationships between initial offers and final outcomes in negotiations (e.g., Karrass 1970). This relationship is supported by the findings reported in Table 5. Higher individual profit levels (IP_p) are positively related to profit levels associated with both first ($r = .309$, $p < 0.10$) and second ($r = .464$, $p < 0.05$) offers.

The amount of profits associated with bids is also strongly related to several process measures. Generally speaking, extreme first offers and large initial concessions are positively related to representational strategies and attractive players. High-profit second offers and smaller initial concessions are positively related to both powerful strategies (P_p) and low impression formation accuracy. Additionally, the amount of bids was found to be strongly associated with various bargaining behaviors discussed previously (e.g., promises, commitments, etc.). These latter findings, however, are too numerous to report here. No relationships between situational constraints (role of players (SB) or culture (X, JA)) and bidding behaviors were discovered.

Findings related to the timing of bids The bids were summarized by quarters as in the previous "pattern" section. No consistent patterns of bidding behavior, however, were discovered across time periods or cultural groups of interactants (J, A, X).

This part of the analysis did produce one interesting relationship. In 11 of the 12 interactions examined, *sellers* made first offers. Moreover, *sellers* in those 11 interactions made lower (8 cases) or equal (3 cases) profits compared with their respective buyers. In only one case, an American interaction, did a seller make higher profits than a buyer—the same case where the *buyer* made the first offer. Thus emerges an apparent consistency in making first offers and respective roles, and a connection to the outcome of the marketing negotiations.

ANALYSIS OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIORS

In this section of explorations into the process of marketing negotiations, nonverbal aspects of the videotaped interactions are considered. First the rhythm of the conversations will be discussed, specifically examining silent periods and conversational overlaps. Next findings related to facial expressions of the interactants will be presented. Lastly, gaze direction of the participants will be considered. All measurements in this section have been derived irrespective of the verbal content of the interactions to avoid potential bias.

Conversational Rhythm

Communication theory suggests that when two people are effectively sharing ideas their communication behaviors, both verbal, and nonverbal, will be rhythmically coordinated (Erickson 1976, Gumperz 1979). The research findings of others also suggest two areas of potential difficulty in conversations between Japanese and Americans. First, periods of silence will be typical in conversations between Japanese and not typical for Americans. Second, because of cultural differences in systems of conversational coordination (verbal and nonverbal signals), more interruptions can be expected in cross-cultural interactions than intracultural. With these two hypotheses in mind, "silent periods" and "conversational overlaps" are operationally defined and findings reported below.

Silent periods Silent periods are operationally defined as gaps in conversations 10 seconds or more in duration. The time period of 10 seconds was selected somewhat arbitrarily, but it is a long enough period of silence to appear unnatural to most American observers. The tapes were searched for gaps in conversations of 10 seconds or more, and these gaps were noted on the transcripts. Additionally, the participant "breaking" the silent period was noted. The number of silent periods broken by a participant was then divided by the time period of the negotiations to yield the variable OV (see Table 2).

As predicted, silent periods occurred more frequently in the Japanese interactions (approximately 11/hr) than in the American (approximately 7/hr). Furthermore, in the cross-cultural negotiations fewer silent periods were found (approximately

8/hr). Based on these results one might expect the American participants to be more likely to break the silent periods in cross-cultural negotiations. It seems, however, that Japanese participants broke silences 50% more often. This apparent inconsistency is perhaps best explained by looking at the antecedents of the silent periods. In over 80% of the cases *Americans* were the last to speak before silent periods in cross-cultural interactions, but in only 60% of the cases did Japanese respond after the silent periods. These results should be viewed as suggestive only because of the small samples sizes involved (three interactions for each group (J and A)).

As indicated in Table 5, the number of silent periods broken bears little relation to profit levels for either individuals or dyads. The role of the participants appears to be strongly related to breaking silent periods. The results in Table 5 suggest that sellers are more likely to break silent periods during an interaction (ANOVA $R^2 = .16$, $p < 0.10$).

The last aspect of silent periods examined was the bargaining behaviors preceding and succeeding the silent periods. Most frequently silent periods were commenced and broken with commitments, self-disclosures, or questions. No patterns of bargaining behaviors antecedent or consequent to silent periods were discovered across cultural groups (J, A, X).

Conversational overlaps The concept of "interactional synchrony," the unconscious coordination of verbal and nonverbal behaviors of two or more participants in a conversation, is discussed at length in Graham (1980). One possible measure of this construct is the number of conversational overlaps or interruptions during a conversation. Conversational overlaps are defined here as periods when both speakers are talking simultaneously or when the conversational contribution of one speaker *overlaps* that of the other speaker. Identification of such overlaps is independent of the verbal content of the interactions. In the present work, the videotapes were searched for overlaps and such interruptions in the flow of conversation were noted on the transcripts. The number of overlaps (interruptions) by each participant was totaled and divided by the time of negotiation (T) to arrive at values (OV) that might be compared across interactions. The comparison of these values, interruptions per unit time, to several of the variables in the study are reported below.

As portrayed in Table 5, interruptions are negatively related to opponent's expressed satisfaction ($r = -.287$, $p < 0.10$).

The predicted relationship between culture of the parties and the tendency to interrupt was not supported. Conversational overlaps occurred slightly more frequently during cross-cultural interactions than intracultural, but the relationship was not statistically significant. Buyers tended to interrupt more often, but that relationship was also not statistically significant.

The number of overlaps was related to three process measures. First, the tendency to interrupt had a negative relation to impression formation accuracy (IFA_p). Paradoxically, the number of interruptions was positively related to the power of both the player (P_p) and his opponent (P_o). All three relationships are statistically significant ($p < 0.10$).

Facial Expression

Work in facial expression as a communicational behavior is just beginning (Ekman 1980). Therefore, the simplest analysis of the videotape data was performed in this study.

Ten-minute excerpts were selected from each of the 12 videotaped interactions. Using Ekman and Friesen's (1976) scheme, the movement of two action units (AU 4 and AU 12) were coded for each participant during the 10-minute periods. Action unit 12 might be thought roughly as corresponding to a smile and positive responses. Action unit 4 might be thought roughly as corresponding to a brow wrinkle and negative responses. A note was made each time the action unit moved. If the expression was held more than 5 seconds, the duration of the expression was recorded. All such movements were totaled for each participant. For those expressions that lasted longer than 5 seconds, a count was added for each 5-second interval. Thus expressions lasting 0-9 seconds were counted as 1. Expressions lasting 10-14 seconds were counted as 2, and so on. The total count for each individual for each 10-minute excerpt provides the measures, AU 12 and AU 4, listed in Table 2.

This investigator coded all the excerpts of the 12 interactions. Another uninformed coder scored one entire interaction to provide a check on reliability and generality. Intercoder reliability was adequate—6% (calculated using the formula: the difference in the number of units between the coders as a percentage of the total number of units).

Action unit 12 (smiles) As indicated in Table 5, AU 12 is unrelated to most variables in the study. High levels of AU 12 are negatively related to accuracy of impressions for some players ($r = .291$, $p < 0.10$). Smiling is more typical of cross-cultural negotiations (ANOVA $R^2 = .11$, $p < 0.10$). Lastly, the hypothesis that Japanese express more positive emotions receives only negligible support (ANOVA $R^2 = .04$, n.s.).

Action unit 4 (brow wrinkles) Action unit 4 appears to have a greater impact on sales negotiations. Notice the negative relationships with all outcome variables listed in Table 5. Action unit 4 is strongly negatively associated with players' impression formation accuracy ($r = .409$, $p < 0.05$). Brow wrinkles are also associated with reduced opponent credibility (C_o). Extroverts (EI_p) displayed more brow wrinkles ($r = .415$, $p < 0.05$). Finally, the hypothesis that Japanese express fewer negative emotions is not supported by the data.

Synchrony of facial expressions As mentioned previously, communication theory suggests that when two people are effectively sharing ideas their communication behaviors are rhythmically coordinated or "synchronous." A measure of interactional synchrony has been developed here by comparing two participants' facial expressions. The facial expressions of each participant in the 12 interactions were coded separately (as described above). Then the timing of expressions of bargaining partners was compared and periods of shared facial expressions or "mirroring" were identified. Finally, the number of facial expressions *shared* (SFE) was divided

by the total number of expressions for individual participants, giving a value termed "percent shared" (SFE, see Table 2). Shared facial expressions can be thought of as a measure of synchrony or communicational effectiveness—the higher the percent, the more effective the communication.

The values for shared AU 4 expressions were very low and precluded useful comparisons to other variables. The values for shared AU 12 expressions have been compared with other variables in the study and they are reported below. As indicated in Table 5, the percent of shared AU 12 facial expressions is associated with several variables in the study. Most importantly, strong positive relationships were discovered with profit variables including individual profits for opponents. Shared facial expressions were found to be negatively associated with two process measures: credibility (C_p) and attractiveness (A_o). Two of these three relationships are intuitively appealing. The one exception is the inverse relationship with attractiveness of the opponent ($r = -.283, p < 0.10$). The only situational constraint related to SFE was the culture of the individuals (JA). Americans were found to share a higher percentage of smiles (ANOVA $R^2 = .14, p < 0.05$).

Facial Gazing

The final nonverbal variable to be considered in this part of the study is facial gazing. Other researchers have found significant relationships between facial gazing and outcomes of negotiation games (Lewis and Fry 1977). Moreover, several authors have suggested differences in facial gazing behavior across cultures (Argyle and Cook 1976).

In this study, facial gazing is defined as the percentage of time a bargainer gazes at the face of his opponent. The same randomly selected, 10-minute videotape excerpts used in developing facial expression measures served as data here. Using a stopwatch, two observers recorded the time each participant spent gazing at his opponent's face during the 10 minutes, thus giving the measure FG (see Table 2). The method used was very similar to that reported by Lewis and Fry (1977), except that videotapes were reviewed rather than real-time interactions. Using videotapes is a more reliable technique, allowing reviews and reliability checks. Intercoder reliability (calculated using the formula: the difference in the number of units between coders as a percentage of the total number of the units) was found to be 9%, an adequate level.

Comparing the time of facial gazing to other variables in the study yields several interesting relationships (see Table 5). Facial gazing (FG) is inversely related to expressed satisfaction of both participants. Facial gazing is also inversely related to attractiveness of both player and opponent. Differences were found across both cultural variables. As reported by other researchers, Americans appear to gaze at opponents' faces more than Japanese (ANOVA $R^2 = .09, n.s.$), although the relationship is not statistically significant. Additionally, it was found that facial gazing increases during cross-cultural negotiation (ANOVA $R^2 = .20, p < 0.05$). This

latter difference is even more pronounced if only the Japanese groups are compared. The average time of facial gazing for Japanese during intracultural negotiations is 1.3 minutes ($N = 6$), and in cross-cultural negotiations is 3.9 minutes ($N = 6$).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The central question of the research has been: How does cultural variation of the parties involved influence the process and outcome of marketing negotiations? In this study the simplest such relationship has been focused on: marketing interactions between two individuals. It has been my goal to build a deep understanding of this relationship, an understanding that will serve as a foundation in future work involving more complex problems.

The topic of this study is in itself very complex and virgin soil, one that requires a multilevel analysis and a wide perspective. Throughout the study, a trade-off has been made between the goals of richness and completeness and a competing one, that of statistical significance. This latter goal is better served in future work.

The principal theoretical perspective of the study is one adapted from social psychology and exchange theory. It views the outcome of sales negotiations to be a function of three classes of variables: process measures, situational constraints, and individual characteristics.

Individual characteristics were not focused on in the study. Such measurements, however, were made to provide both a means of comparison and to control their influence.

Cultural variation of the parties has been a primary issue of interest. The concept of culture defies simple definition. Indeed, one of the variables of culture described by anthropologists is differences in decision-making processes. And so it was anticipated that the process of marketing negotiations in Japan and the United States would differ. Given these cultural differences in negotiation processes, a second, but not secondary, question has been: What happens when parties of the two cultures meet across a negotiation table? Answers to both questions have been revealed in the study.

Development of New Process Measures

A primary objective in this research has been the development of measures of process variables. Little attention has been paid to them in the past. The basic view guiding the exploratory work comes from communication theory. That is, effective communication and mutual understanding are a function of three classes of variables: verbal behaviors, nonverbal behaviors, and social context. Measures of all three constructs have been developed here.

Twelve interactions were videotaped, translated, and transcribed. From the transcriptions and tapes, a series of process measures were developed and then compared with the other variables in the study. Sample size was small ($N = 24$).

Intuitively appealing relationships, however, were discovered with other variables in the study, thus providing some indication of validity. Reliability was measured and found to be adequate. In this phase of the study explicit hypotheses were not stated and tested. Instead, it is expected that these explorations will suggest relations and interrelations among the numerous variables measured.

An example of the utility of these analyses is the comparison of the process variables measured via participant judgments and self-report (i.e., questionnaire data) with those measured using observational methods. A comparison provides some information about nomological and convergent validity of both types of measures. First, characteristics ascribed to players' strategies will be compared with observed player behaviors. Second, characteristics ascribed to players' strategies will be compared with observed actions of *opponents* (see Table 5).

Representational bargaining strategies (RI_p) are unrelated to percentages of representational bargaining behaviors; positively associated with large initial concessions; and negatively associated with promises and warnings. Attractiveness is positively associated with high first offers and high second offers; and inversely related to punishments, commands, and facial gazings. Power is positively associated with recommendations, warnings, rewards, positive normative appeals, high second offers, and conversational overlaps; and negatively associated with commitments and large initial concessions. Credibility is negatively associated with warnings and shared facial expressions. Impression formation accuracy is *positively* related to large initial concessions; and *inversely* related to high second offers, conversational overlaps, smiles, brow wrinkles, shared facial expressions, and facial gazing.

Representational strategies are positively associated with *opponent* rewards and negatively associated with opponent commands. Attractiveness is positively related to *opponent* representational behaviors, high first offers, and large initial concessions; and inversely related to opponents' promises, warnings, positive normative appeals, shared facial expressions, and facial gazing. Power is positively associated with *opponent* conversational overlaps; and negatively associated with opponent threats and rewards. Credibility is positively related to opponent promises; and inversely related to opponent commands and brow wrinkles. Lastly, impression formation accuracy is *positively* associated with opponent punishments; and negatively associated to opponent smiles, shared facial expressions, and facial gazing.

Although there is an implicit danger in such post hoc interpretations (e.g., Kerlinger 1973), it is illustrative, for a moment, to further consider one of these relationships. Representational bargaining strategies (RI) is one of the best measures in the study. It consists of both participant self-report and opponent judgmental data. It has been shown to be both internally consistent and reliable (Graham 1980). Also, because of the numerous logically consistent relationships with other variables in the study, it is considered both nomologically and systematically valid. It apparently fails the test of convergent validity, however, when compared with an analogous construct, representational bargaining *behaviors*, which is measured through observational methods ($r = .066$, n.s.). Recall that representational behavior was a pooled content category (the sum of percentages of recommendations, warnings,

commitments, and self-disclosures), as suggested by Angelmar and Stern (1978). Although theoretical support exists for this latter definition of representational behaviors, bargainers evidently use different criteria for making judgments about themselves and others. Representational bargaining *strategies* (RI) are strongly associated with three of the process measures developed in the exploratory phase. Large initial concessions seem to play a very important part in judgments of representational *strategies* ($r = .626, p < 0.01$). Moreover, representational strategies are inversely related to bargaining categories, promises ($r = -.394, p < 0.05$) and warnings ($r = -.382, p < 0.10$). Indeed, the latter relationship suggests Angelmar and Stern's (1978) definition to be faulty.

An Overview of the Impact of Cultural Variation of the Parties

Included in this section is a brief summary of findings related to the experimental manipulations (i.e., cultural variation of the parties). First, culture-specific bargaining behaviors will be discussed.

Culture-specific bargaining behaviors Japanese and American marketing negotiations appear to differ in several ways. Results of the laboratory experimentation and questionnaire data (Graham 1980) suggest that in American negotiations honest information from opponents is important for high player performance in the game. Alternatively, in Japanese negotiations informative and credible opponents have no effect on players' performance. The former relationship is logically consistent and theoretically sound. But the latter is also when viewed from the perspective of Japanese value systems. Condon explains the paradigm well:

This involves the very much Japanese double standard for *tatemae* and *honne*. *Tatemae* can be translated as "truthful," and the latter, *honne*, as "true mind." But this is rather misleading because it looks, then, as though Japanese condone hypocrisy as a morality, which is not at all the case. *Tatemae* is any rule of conduct which Japanese accept by unanimous agreement, and you would be wrong if you think that Japanese do not take it seriously. They do. It is like a viable license which secures them membership in a coveted group. Still it is a formal front rather than a principle—in the English sense—behind which one may safely and continuously entertain one's *honne*. The discrepancy between the two (*tatemae* and *honne*) is borne, and not at all vaguely, in a good conscience. (Condon 1974: 15.)

This difference in Japanese value systems manifests itself in statements by Japanese negotiators in the retrospective protocols. Japanese often describe Americans as honest and frank, but to the point of discomfort for Japanese.

Condon (1974) also reports that a key concept in understanding Japanese personality and values is *amae*. The best English translation is "to seek to protect a relationship." This part explains the circumstance mentioned above. For Japanese it is more important to maintain the relationship than to be frank and open. And this importance of relationships manifests itself in other ways in the study. American

players achieve higher profits by making opponents feel *uncomfortable*, while Japanese achieve higher profits by making opponents feel comfortable. For Americans, the role of the player was positively associated with performance. For Japanese, however, the negotiators's role was the single most important variable for explaining player performance, far overshadowing others. Maintenance of the status relationship is imperative in Japanese negotiations; thus, the long periods of task-related exchange of information mentioned by others in field interviews. The information exchange is rendered inefficient (from the American perspective) because of this importance of *amae*. The situation (i.e., the status relationship) determines the outcome of Japanese negotiations, not haggling and the tactics and personality of bargainers, as in American negotiations.

Also consistent with these cultural differences in values are other observed negotiation behaviors. Contrary to the hypothesis suggested by Van Zandt (1970), Japanese, like Americans, use aggressive persuasive tactics. In Japanese negotiations, however, they tend to be used only by buyers and in the later stages of the negotiations (when all else fails). Silence is perhaps the strongest persuasive strategy in Japanese negotiations, one in keeping with *amae*. Lastly, facial gazing is much less frequent during Japanese negotiations, thus limiting leakage of potentially offending affective information.

One other bargaining variable seems to be culture-specific: first offers. In the 12 interactions taped, Japanese asked for consistently higher profit solutions when making the initial offer in a negotiation. Americans were more apt to offer a "fair" price, one that was closer to the eventual solution.

Cross-cultural bargaining behaviors Given these culture-specific styles of bargaining, how are mutual decisions made? The evidence in the study indicates that outcomes (profits and satisfaction) of cross-cultural marketing negotiations were no different than intracultural ones except for the amount of time spent. One would expect that adjustments are made by both parties; that is, not only are outcomes negotiated, but also processes.

A quick look at differences between cross-cultural and intracultural negotiations through the perspective of the laboratory experimentation provides only limited insight. We have learned that negotiations take significantly longer, that impression formation accuracy is reduced, and that representational strategies are less prevalent in cross-cultural interactions; and the latter two process measures, impression formation accuracy and representational strategies, influence negotiation outcomes (Graham 1980).

Even more revealing are the data derived from the exploratory phase of the work. In this study it appears that the Japanese were more likely to adjust their behavior. In cross-cultural interactions Japanese participants dramatically increased facial gazing, increased the number of smiles, and decreased the number of aggressive persuasive tactics. The Americans were found to make few analogous adjustments. This may, in large part, be explained by the fact that all Japanese participants in the videotaped negotiations had been in the United States at least six months previous to the experiment. These apparent adjustments by the Japanese to American negotiation styles are evidence of what Erickson (1976) terms bicultural

competence—the ability to communicate in two culture-specific styles. Also, there are fewer silent periods in cross-cultural negotiations. But this is apparently not due to Japanese adjustments as much as Americans filling potential silent periods with new arguments.

There is an important implication underlying this apparent adjustment on the part of the Japanese and not the American negotiators. It is a consideration not brought out specifically in the findings of the study. Acculturation theory suggests that power relations determine who adopts and adapts behaviors in a cross-cultural setting. Japanese executives in an American research setting are likely to be the ones to modify behaviors. Were this research conducted in Japan, results might be somewhat different. Moreover, in American negotiations status relations are less defined and less important. The Japanese seller can apparently “fit” into such a situation without offending the American buyer. If an American seller takes his normative set of bargaining behaviors to Japan, however, then negotiations are apt to end abruptly.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH FOR THEORY, METHOD, AND PRACTICE

The contributions of this research to theory, method and practice are briefly discussed below.

Theory

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, cross-cultural marketing negotiations have not been studied in a systematic way. This work makes a contribution to our understanding of the concepts of culture and negotiation process measures. Empirical support is provided for differences in decision-making behavior between Japanese businessmen and American businessmen.

The theory developed here achieves some degree of internal consistency. Our understanding of the phenomenon is further clarified through the development and use of a wide range of variables that are reliable and valid measures of theoretical constructs.

Methodological Contributions

The contributions to method are important, too. A relatively novel methodology has been developed and presented for analyzing human interaction. It includes ways of recording interaction not used before (three cameras), and ways of analyzing data in which a preselected level of analysis is unnecessary. The method includes a new measure of interpersonal communication: facial expression.

Finally, the study demonstrates how findings from a broad array of methods

might be integrated. The methods applied in the study have included executive interviews, participant observation of sales negotiations in two countries, a laboratory experiment, the use of two psychological scales, participant self-report and judgment information, retrospective protocols, and observational methods.

Practice

The increased understanding of cross-cultural marketing negotiations gained through this research might serve as the basis for training programs for executives and salespeople preparing for travel to foreign countries or for retail sales personnel in mixed ethnic settings in this country. The initial goal of such a training effort would be an awareness of the possible causes of difficulties in cross-cultural marketing negotiations. These causes might include culture-specific bargaining styles related to (1) the importance and timing of nontask sounding, task-related exchange of information, concessions, and agreements; (2) the use of aggressive persuasive appeals; (3) the importance of status or rank; and (4) differences in facial gazing, silent periods, and listening behaviors. Gumperz (1979) has suggested the value of developing both a knowledge of *and* a sensitivity to the diverse causes and consequences of communication breakdown. Thus, the cost of communication interferences might be reduced via understanding. Such training might involve active participation in simulated cross-cultural marketing encounters and accompanying videotape viewing to demonstrate and explicate problem areas. This kind of training has proven worthwhile in both governmental (Feldman 1976) and industrial settings (Gumperz 1979).

Additionally, the knowledge gained through such an approach might enable managers to select more effective salespeople and negotiating teams. For example, Erickson (1976) has suggested that members of ethnic and cultural minorities are often more flexible in their communication abilities and more aware of subtle differences in communication style. Or, as he puts it, they possess "*bicultural competence*—knowledge of both the minority and majority patterns for doing things, including the doing of everyday interaction." The ideal sales team might include members with such bicultural competence. Further, availability of such qualified personnel also has long-term implications for optimal sales force composition and organization and even channel strategies. For example, relatively few Americans have such bicultural competence regarding Japan. This is one of the reasons why American firms have tended to use third parties (e.g., agents and trading companies) in distributing products in Japanese markets.

Attention to problems of cross-cultural communication and marketing negotiations may also help solve our persisting trade deficits by helping to overcome such subtle but real trade barriers as described above. And, at the most general level, this knowledge will potentially contribute to the effectiveness of all cross-cultural communicators and negotiators, whether their interests abroad be of a commercial, humanitarian, or political nature.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study might be improved upon in several ways. More reliable measures of process variables might easily be accomplished given more resources (i.e., more coders and more time for training). More resources would also allow for larger sample sizes and concomitant improved confidence in relationships among variables developed in the exploratory phase. Larger sample sizes would not only allow for increased confidence in results, but also the complex relationships of the many process variables might be sorted out, including causal relationships. For example, what are the antecedents and consequences of threats? More careful examination of the antecedents and consequences of communicational asynchrony in cross-cultural negotiations is perhaps most important.

Additionally, several important issues have been raised in the study that deserve more attention. A brief listing of them is appropriate here. Each issue was discussed and explanations proposed earlier in the paper. (1) The problem of language was not handled well. With large sample sizes TOEFL scores might be used to measure language abilities for alien participants. (2) Few cultural differences were discovered in the coherent analysis work (e.g., the use of threats, promises, etc.). Coders from both Japanese and American cultural backgrounds should be used in future work. Further, variation in data used for analysis (i.e., transcripts, audio tapes, or videotapes) may affect results. (3) No cultural differences were discovered in the amount of facial expressions. Communication theorists suggest that differences will be found in elicitors of facial expressions, and this hypothesis deserves investigation.

The work might be extended in several directions. The focus of this study has been dyads. Small groups should also be studied and many of the methods developed here would be readily applicable. Differences in bargaining behaviors across other groups (i.e., Brazilian/American, Brazilian/Japanese, men/women, and so on) might be investigated. Such work would not only serve to validate these findings, but also theory would suggest even different variables to be important for different groups.

Finally, the performance measure, individual profits in a negotiation game, should be validated through comparison to actual negotiation or sales performance. Certainly, negotiation skills are important in marketing and other settings, but presently there is no way to adequately measure them. Correlation between performance in the game and performance in the field will not only serve to aid in the research process, but also in the selection of negotiators and salespeople.

NOTE

1. The substantially improved unitizing reliability score (.82 for this work compared with .69 for Angelmar and Stern) can be primarily attributed to the structure of the data. Conversational data are more easily broken into units because most utterances (bounded by the other speaker's utterances) consist of a single content category.

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APPENDIX A

Postexercise Questionnaire

(all responses will be kept in strictest confidence) NAME _____

Part I. We would like you to answer some questions about the negotiation game in which you have just participated.

Please circle your answers to the questions in the following manner:

black white
5 4 3 2 1

1. If an agreement was reached, how satisfied were you with that agreement?

satisfied dissatisfied
5 4 3 2 1

2. How satisfied were you with the agreement relative to your pre-game expectations?

satisfied dissatisfied
5 4 3 2 1

3. How satisfied were you with your individual profit level?

satisfied dissatisfied
5 4 3 2 1

4. How satisfied were you with your performance during the game?

satisfied dissatisfied
5 4 3 2 1

5. How comfortable did you feel with the particular person with whom you were paired?

comfortable uncomfortable
5 4 3 2 1

6. How interested were you in the person with whom you were paired?

interested uninterested
5 4 3 2 1

7. How interested would you be in seeing the person with whom you were paired again?

interested uninterested
5 4 3 2 1

8. How well acquainted were you with your partner before this research took place?

well this was our
acquainted first meeting
5 4 3 2 1

9. Who had the most influence in determining what was talked about during the game?

I had more my partner had
influence more influence
5 4 3 2 1

10. How well were you able to evaluate the impact of your arguments on your partner?

very well not very well
5 4 3 2 1

11. Do you feel that the person with whom you were paired was more interested in solving your mutual problem, or more self-interested?

solving a mutual problem					self-interested
	5	4	3	2	1

12. Rate yourself on the same scale.

solving a mutual problem					self-interested
	5	4	3	2	1

13. Rate your partner's bargaining strategies on the following scales:

exploitative					accommodating
	5	4	3	2	1

honest					deceptive
	5	4	3	2	1

ineffective					effective
	5	4	3	2	1

informative					persuasive
	5	4	3	2	1

unbiased					biased
	5	4	3	2	1

skillful					unskillful
	5	4	3	2	1

powerful					weak
	5	4	3	2	1

14. Rate your own bargaining strategies on the following scale:

exploitative					accommodating
	5	4	3	2	1

honest					deceptive
	5	4	3	2	1

ineffective					effective
	5	4	3	2	1

informative					persuasive
	5	4	3	2	1

unbiased					biased
	5	4	3	2	1

skillful					unskillful
	5	4	3	2	1

powerful					weak
	5	4	3	2	1

15. If an agreement was not reached, please list the reasons you think important on the back of this sheet.

16. List the letters of your agreement.

17. Record the time of negotiation ___ minutes.

18. Were you a buyer ___ or seller ___?

(All responses will be kept in strictest confidence)

Part II. In order that we may gain an understanding of individual negotiators—how they feel, think, react, and so on—please indicate your responses to the following statements about how you feel about yourself and aspects of your emotions and behavior.

	like me	very much			unlike me
1. Ordinarily, I concern myself with only economic issues in a negotiation.	5	4	3	2	1
2. I feel that building personal relationships in negotiations produces the best results.	5	4	3	2	1
3. To me, getting the best deal in a negotiation is all that really matters.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I am usually quite confident when learning a new game or sport.	5	4	3	2	1
5. I make a better follower than leader.	5	4	3	2	1
6. I have never been a very popular person.	5	4	3	2	1
7. I rarely feel self-conscious in a strange group.	5	4	3	2	1
8. I am an effective bargainer.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It is easy for me to strike up a conversation with someone.	5	4	3	2	1
10. I am not the type of person one remembers after one meeting.	5	4	3	2	1
11. I am seldom at a loss for words.	5	4	3	2	1
12. I am considered a leader in my social circle.	5	4	3	2	1
13. I usually get my way in arguments.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I am ill at ease when I am meeting new people.	5	4	3	2	1
15. My behavior would be quite awkward if I had to apply for a loan at a bank.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I enjoy stating my opinions in front of a group.	5	4	3	2	1
17. I often wish that I were more outgoing.	5	4	3	2	1
18. It's hard for me to change other people's minds.	5	4	3	2	1
19. People seem to be interested in getting to know me better.	5	4	3	2	1
20. I seem to do more listening than talking in conversations with others.	5	4	3	2	1
21. I like to remain unnoticed when others are around.	5	4	3	2	1
22. I usually try to add a little excitement to a party.	5	4	3	2	1
23. I would make a good negotiator.	5	4	3	2	1
24. I have trouble expressing my opinion.	5	4	3	2	1
25. I am able to talk intelligently to people in a wide variety of occupations.	5	4	3	2	1
26. I find it easy to introduce people.	5	4	3	2	1
27. I prefer to go to social functions with a group of people so as not to stand out.	5	4	3	2	1
28. I enjoy negotiation situations.	5	4	3	2	1

29. In a negotiation, I seldom concern myself with how the other person(s) feels. 5 4 3 2 1
30. To me, it is important to drive the best bargain at all costs. 5 4 3 2 1
31. I favor establishing good personal relations during a business negotiation. 5 4 3 2 1

Please circle either yes or no for each answer:

1. Do you sometimes feel happy, sometimes depressed, without any apparent reason? yes no
2. Do you prefer action to planning for action? yes no
3. Do you have frequent ups and downs in mood, either with or without apparent cause? yes no
4. Are you happiest when you get involved in some project that calls for rapid action? yes no
5. Are you inclined to being moody? yes no
6. Does your mind often wander while you are trying to concentrate? yes no
7. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? yes no
8. Are you inclined to be quick and sure in your actions? yes no
9. Are you frequently "lost in thought" even when supposed to be taking part in conversation? yes no
10. Would you rate yourself as a lively individual? yes no
11. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish? yes no
12. Would you be very unhappy if you were prevented from making numerous social contacts? yes no

Part III. As an individual you have your own values. These values generally determine what is important to you and what is not. This portion of the survey helps us understand what is or is not important to you. It is necessary that you follow the directions below.

Study the list of the 18 values below carefully. Then *circle* the value which you believe is the *most* important to you. Please **CIRCLE IT NOW**.

Next compare each value to the value you circled in terms of its *importance* to you. The value circled is assumed to be worth 100 points. *For example*, if you circle 'PLEASURE' as your most important value, you will place an 'x' under 100 on the line indicating 'PLEASURE.' Then starting with 'A COMFORTABLE LIFE,' you will ask yourself how many points A COMFORTABLE LIFE is worth to you if PLEASURE is worth 100 points. If you think it is worth 25 points, you will put an 'x' halfway between 20 and 30 on the chart. Next, you will compare 'AN EXCITING LIFE' with PLEASURE, and so on. The *least important* value compared to the value you circled will have the lowest number of points.

Relative importance compared to the value you circled.

Values	The value circled = 100										
	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)	_____										
AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)	_____										
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)	_____										

- A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict) _____
- A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts) _____
- EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity) _____
- FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones) _____
- FREEDOM (independence, free choice) _____
- HAPPINESS (contentedness) _____
- INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict) _____
- MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy) _____
- NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack) _____
- PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life) _____
- SALVATION (saved eternal life) _____
- SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem) _____
- SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration) _____
- TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship) _____
- WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) _____

Below is another list of 18 values. Study the list carefully. *Circle* the value which you believe is the *most important* to you. Next compare each value to the value you circled in terms of its *importance* to you; same as before. The value you circled is assumed to be worth 100 points.

Relative importance compared to the value you circled.

The value circled = 100

Values	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)											
BROAD-MINDED (open-minded)											
CAPABLE (competent, effective)											
CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)											
CLEAN (neat, tidy)											
COURAGEOUS (standing for your beliefs)											
FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)											

- HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) _____
- HONEST (sincere, truthful) _____
- IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative) _____
- INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient) _____
- INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflective) _____
- LOGICAL (consistent, rational) _____
- LOVING (affectionate, tender) _____
- OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful) _____
- POLITE (courteous, well-mannered) _____
- RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) _____
- SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined) _____

Part IV. We are interested in what negotiator traits you feel are important. Below you will find six groups of negotiator traits. Please rank the items within each group in order of importance.

Task Performance Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 7, 1 = most important)

Item No.

- 11 ___ Physical stamina
- 12 ___ Preparation and planning skill
- 13 ___ Knowledge of product being bought
- 14 ___ Degree of reliability and industriousness
- 15 ___ Degree to which person strives to achieve objectives. (Dedication to job)
- 16 ___ General problem-solving skills
- 17 ___ Degree of individual initiative

Aggression Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 7)

- 21 ___ Persistence and determination
- 22 ___ Willingness to take somewhat above average business or career risks
- 23 ___ Ability to perceive and exploit available power to achieve objective
- 24 ___ Competitiveness (Desire to compete and win)
- 25 ___ Willingness to employ force, threat or bluff to avoid being exploited
- 26 ___ Courage

- 27 — Ability to lead and control members of own team or group

Socializing Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 8)

Item No.

- 31 — Trusting temperament
32 — Patience
33 — Attractive personality and sense of humor (degree to which people enjoy being with person)
34 — Integrity
35 — Tact and discretion
36 — Fair and open-minded (tolerance of other viewpoints)
37 — Appearance
38 — Compromising temperament

Communication Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 7)

- 41 — Ability to express thoughts verbally
42 — Ability to create close personal rapport with opponent (*prior to and during negotiations*)
43 — Listening skill
44 — Skill in communicating by signs, gestures, and silence (nonverbal language)
45 — Debating ability (skill in parrying questions and answers across the table)
46 — Skill in communicating and coordinating various objectives within own organization
47 — Ability to skillfully act out a variety of negotiating roles or postures

Self-Worth Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 8)

Item No.

- 51 — Ability to win respect and confidence of opponent
52 — Degree of self-confidence and self-esteem (personal sense of security)
53 — Personal dignity (as differentiated from dignity of position)
54 — Ability to win respect and confidence of boss
55 — Standard of business ethics
56 — Status or rank in organization
57 — Self-control
58 — Willingness to risk being disliked

Thought Process Variables

(Rank each item in importance from 1 to 8)

- 61 — Previous negotiating experience
- 62 — Judgment and general intelligence
- 63 — Broad perspective or viewpoint
- 64 — Insight into hidden needs and reactions of own and opponent's organization
- 65 — Decisiveness
- 66 — Analytical ability
- 67 — Ability to think clearly and rapidly under pressure and uncertainty
- 68 — Formal education level

Of the 45 negotiation traits listed above, what three (3) are most important in your business?

- 1. Most important Item No. _____
- 2. Next most important Item No. _____
- 3. Third most important Item No. _____

EXAMPLE: Physical stamina, Item No. 11, is one possible candidate.

Part V. This is the last part. Just a few demographic questions!

- 1. Age _____
- 2. City of residence _____
- 3. Undergraduate university _____
and major _____
- 4. Employer _____
Your position _____
How much of your work in that position involves contact with people outside your firm? Please circle your response.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

- 5. Number of years full-time work experience _____
- 6. Please make any comments, criticisms, or suggestions regarding the exercise and questionnaire.
- 7. Although your individual responses will be kept strictly confidential, the results of the analysis of the information (in summary form) will be reported to all participants. Please indicate the address to which your copy of the report should be forwarded.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How do communication difficulties "lead to feelings of uncertainty and unpredictability," "aggravate intergroup tension," and "lead to personal frustration and powerlessness"? (Refer to Gumperz, Chapter 13)
2. Why do you think many groups of second language learners continue to use the contextualization cues of their first languages when communicating in their second?
3. In what specific ways could intermediaries who are familiar with the cultures and concerns of populations of ESL learners help improve communication between native and nonnative English speakers?
4. Gumperz claims that the success of an individual in the workplace is often more a matter of "skill in communication with native speakers than of technical know-how." Do you agree with Gumperz? Why or why not?
5. What are some of the factors that you believe contribute to the deterioration of interethnic relations? What are some factors not mentioned by Gumperz that impede interethnic relations?
6. According to Gumperz, contextualization conventions are culturally determined. He states: "To the extent that such interactive experience is a function of home background, and insofar as home background relates to ethnicity, knowledge of such rhetorical conventions is ethnically determined." Do you agree with Gumperz? What other factors besides culture might affect the use of contextualization cues?
7. Some ESL teachers attempt to teach contextualization conventions through dialogues, role-plays, simulations, films, and videotapes. Yet Gumperz warns that contextualization conventions are "context-bound" and therefore not readily amenable to classroom teaching. To what extent do you think ESL teachers should attempt to teach contextualization cues? Are they best taught by exposing students to input (such as videotapes and films) or by having students interact with native speakers?
8. What are some of the difficulties in cross-cultural marketing negotiations that Graham describes in Chapter 14?
9. Graham observed that some of his Japanese subjects who communicated with U.S. Americans seemed to become bicultural. This capability seemed to enable them to achieve a higher degree of success in their business negotiations. Why?